On Saturday 17 September 1127, in Bruges, William Clito, the newly appointed count of Flanders, proclaimed the re-imposition of tolls on the town, which he had abolished on his accession only fi ve months previously. The burgesses of Bruges regarded the count's new impositions as unjustifi ed and unreasonable. The tolls had been remitted by William as part of a package of concessions granted in order to gain the support of the city of Bruges during the dispute over the succession to the county which had broken out on the murder of Count Charles 'the Good' by some of his vassals on 2 March of the same year. The reason for William's action in September was that before the remission of the tolls, the revenue accruing from them had been enfeoffed to several of his vassals. These vassals were now evidently in fi nancial diffi culties, and claimed that the count had not had the right to remit the toll without their consent, since it constituted a diminution of their fi efs; equally, they argued, the people of Bruges had no right to demand remission from the count.
could William not have found the means to compensate one or the other, rather than having to choose between depriving his vassals of their income, and breaking his word to the burgesses? Unlike modern governments, the medieval Flemish comital administration evidently did not have the option of shuffl ing income and expenditure around to the extent necessary to cover the amounts lost by the remission of the toll. Bruges was clearly the most important city in the county, and the main source of the count's wealth; the importance of the assignation of revenues from the tolls there was that they represented a regular form of income, and one which was probably in the form of cash rather than kind. The revenues derived directly from the urban tolls may thus have been far more attractive to William Clito's vassals than the tenure of perhaps modest country estates.
This episode, from Flanders in the year 1127, shows the workings of an institution generally known in French-language scholarship as the fi ef-rente, and in English either as fi ef-rent or money-fi ef. There was a simple distinction between this and what we might clumsily, although usefully, think of as the 'traditional fi ef '. The latter constituted a source of revenue: this source might consist of land or rights which produced income, which might be in the form of cash (such as rents) or kind (i.e. produce or renders) or a combination of the two. The money-fi ef, by contrast, was limited to the income itself.
2 Even though money-fi efs, when described in the sources, were normally described in terms of a sum of money expressed as an annual payment, the practicalities of medieval life meant that they were most probably paid out in the form of smaller amounts at shorter intervals. This explains why money-fi efs were hypothecated, that is, they were tied to specifi c sources of revenue, as in the case of the tolls of Bruges. This element of hypothecation is signifi cant, as it is one feature that distinguished the money-fi ef from a simple money grant or pension.
In its distribution the money fi ef was limited to those parts of Western Christendom that had an economy in which trade and industry were more important than agriculture. A recent study of the moneyfi ef in Flanders has argued that it was a military institution, whose 'primary goal was to attract foreigners who would serve the prince on the battlefi eld'.
3 Clearly, the money fi ef seemed to form a system of remuneration for military service that was distinct from the traditional feudo-vassalic bonds. Scholarship has always accepted that money-fi efs formed an important element in the recruitment of military forces in
